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The Moral Irrelevance ofAutonomy 
30 Where did the idea get started that autonomy is a moral 
idea which all rational persons ought to pursue and a 
constitutive feature of normal adult human life? Perhaps 
it was on an island, where controlling the boats that arrived 
on and departed from one's shores was essential for 
survival. If exercising control over one's watery 
boundaries means the difference between life and death, 
then control will become an important feature of that form 
of life. It is also likely that certain habits will be 
encouraged, habits like disciplining one's thoughts and 
emotions, pursuing one's interests, deliberately formulating 
a plan of life, and sticking to it. But "control" may come 
at the cost of other habits, such as "release," including the 
capacity to express emotion, sacrifice one's own desires, 
put the physical and spiritual needs of the vulnerable above 
one's own. Informal observation of the world tells me that 
the first set of traits is typically found in certain individuals 
(e.g., male anglophile academics), and not in others (e.g., 
female conservative Christians), and more commonly 
found in certain communities (e.g., secular institutions of 
higher learning in western Europe and North America), 
and not in others (e.g., loosely-knit networks of Iranian 
women friends). This is not surprising, of course. The 
first set of virtues are those conducive to the sustenance of 
certain forms of life, and the second set are those conducive 
to the sustenance of other forms of life. We should not 
fault one for not being the other. 
31 It is also to employ the sort of gendered language 
feminists have taught us to recognize as rhetorical in the worst 
sense. It is the worst because it sounds benign even as it 
carries powerful political import. Its use has long been the 
most subtle and effective tool with which one group (often 
composed primarily but not exclusively ofmen) has, wittingly 
or unwittingly, marginalized the moral experiences and 
languages of other groups (often composed largely but not 
exclusively of women). To continue to pursue such ways of 
speaking is not profitable for those of us trying to listen "with 
a different ear" to "the different voices" not only of women 
but also of all those historically excluded from the moral 
philosophers' games. I take the phrases from Gilligan and 
Claudia Card, the latter of whom has written that "It is 
important to listen to women with a dijferenJ ear, not simply 
to listen for a dijferenJ voice in women." Card, "Women's 
Voices," p. 134. 
32In addition to the commentators whose responses follow, 
I have profited from the criticisms of Ned Hettinger, Peter 
List, Phil Quinn, Richard Noland, and Harry Frankfurt. I 
discussed the paper with colleagues in the Philosophy 
Departments at Oregon State University and Western Illinois 
University; read it at the Society for the Study of Ethics and 
Animals at the 1990 Pacific Division Meeting; and read it 
again at a conference on animal rights at San Francisco State 
University in April, 1990. 
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There are many things to say about Comstock's 
paper. I want to comment on two issues: the role of 
"line drawing about autonomy" in the discussion ofour 
treatment of animals and the conclusion that fuller 
a'ltonomy might decrease the moral quality of the life 
of a caring woman such as Carrie. 
Comstock's basic point is that "autonomy is virtually 
useless as a line telling us which beings have and which 
beings do not have moral standing." The bulk of his 
paper is devoted to an argument that autonomy is not 
always part of a good life for human beings. aimed to 
show that a line drawn in terms of autonomy between 
humans and nonhumans is at best very fuzzy, But what 
is the relevance of this strategy to conclusions we might 
draw about our treatment of animals? 
Comstock's strategy is directed to an argument for 
differential treatment of humans and nonhumans which 
goes like this. Defenders of the differential treatment 
of humans and nonhumans rely on showing that humans 
and nonhumans have different moral statuses. One 
method of showing this different status is to attribute a 
property to humans that nonhumans lack. Autonomy 
is the property used by Frey to draw this line. But if 
the line cannot be drawn, because autonomy is not of 
value to all humans, then we cannot show that humans 
and nonhumans have different moral statuses and thus 
that it is permissible to treat them differently. 
But there are crucial gaps in Comstock's strategy. 
First, even if we grant that increased autonomy would 
not be good for all humans, it does not follow that 
autonomy is irrelevant to how we ought to treat them. 
Second, there are many ways to defend differential 
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treatment of humans and nonhumans short of showing 
they have different moral statuses. Suppose, for 
example, that someone wants to defend a preference 
for using nonhuman animals for risky, nontherapeutic 
medical research, under circumstances in which 
research subjects are necessary for the discovery of 
scientific knowledge that is likely to reduce human 
mortality or morbidity, utilization of research subjects 
is limited, and pain and risks to subjects are minimized 
consistent with scientific requirements. This preference 
might be defended on utilitarian grounds. Or it might 
be defended on the ground that there are different and 
stronger objections to the killing of humans than there 
are to the killing of nonhumans. Relations among 
humans, rights, and even autonomy might be the basis 
for such objections. Whatever we think of these 
arguments, rejecting a bright line drawn in terms of 
autonomy doesn't answer the human chauvinist who 
has more limited reasons for his humanoid preferences. 
On Comstock's account, autonomy requires self-
determination on three fronts. (Comstock says his 
account is based on Frey's, and I'll let Frey speak for 
himself about whether it is his.) Autonomy requires, 
first, acting on our own behalf, that is, self-reliance; 
. second, ordering our own preferences, that is, self-
control; and third, deciding on our own about the kind 
of life we want to lead, i.e., self-determination. There 
is ambiguity in Comstock's presentation of these 
elements of autonomy, particularly with respect to how 
individualistic and how radical they are. 
Comstock describes the requirement of self-reliance 
variously, as "the freedom to acton our own behalf,"" 'our 
desire to achieve things for ourselves,' " "rely[ing] on 
[our] own talents and powers," "not [being] subject to 
control by paternalistic outside forces," and being" 'free 
of the coercive influence of others.'" The example he 
gives of this requirement is a woman who refuses to let 
her husband write the papers necessary for her to get 
tenure. Because of this example, and because Comstock's 
third element focuses on external influences on choice, I 
take this first requirement of autonomy to be about 
standing on one's own feet, being independent and self-
reliant. The woman who lets her husband establish her 
credentials is an extreme case; She is fraudulently 
claiming credit for someone else's work and not achieving 
what she ought to achieve on her own. But Comstock's 
descriptions suggest that he has a broader range of self-
reliance in mind for autonomy. How much broader, 
however, is difficult to determine. Do I lack autonomy if 
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I hire (and properly credit) a research assistant? If I join 
with others to develop a team-taught course in which we 
reciprocally rely on each other's contributions? Comstock 
describes an open-ended linkage between autonomy and 
self-reliance, under which it is unclear whether such 
appropriate forms of interdependence and cooperation 
might violate autonomy. 
Internal self-control is the second element of 
autonomy as described by Comstock. He refers to this 
element as "making higher order decisions about the 
relative imporlance of lower order desires," "devot[ing 
ourselves] to the desires [we] desire most," and as 
"forego[ing] certain lower order preferences." There 
is a clear confusion here between structure and 
substance. The regulative principle that we should order 
our desires to allow coherent action toward what we 
most want is not the same as the substantive requirement 
that we should forego lesser pleasures such as recreation 
in the service of higher values of achievement such as 
academic promotion. Comstock's choice of career 
achievement as a clear example of a higher order 
preference once again suggests an apparent identifi-
cation of autonomy with individualistic values. 
Comstock's final element of autonomy is self-
determination in the sense of choosing for ourselves 
who we want to be. Sometimes Comstock suggests 
this means being free altogether of background 
influences, such as family traditions. At other points 
he suggests it means only deliberately selecting our own 
life from a menu of conceptions of the good life. 
Comstock's example offailed self-determination is the 
man who stays with the family business rather than 
becoming a painter, a choice described as letting others 
impose their conceptions of the good life on him. ·But 
bowing to his father's dictates is only one explanation 
of such a choice, the explanation that would involve a 
clear loss of self-determination. Other explanations of 
the choice, such as concern for his father or desire to carry 
on the family tradition, stem from nonindividualistic 
values that may not indicate a loss of self-determination. 
Now why is Carrie deficient in autonomy? She 
muddles through life, in a motherly way, thinking she 
might like to do something else. Here are some 
deficiencies listed by Comstock: 
I. She has not deliberately chosen a life plan. 
2. The causal explanation for what she does-
mothering-is largely her upbringing. 
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3. What she does involves the fulfillment of"lower 
order" desires, motherhood and nurturance, 
rather than a "career" (I put "career" in quotes 
because the implication that motherhood is not 
a "career" is Comstock's, not mine). 
4. She allows herself to pursue cooperative 
strategies and takes interest in others' needs 
rather than her own self-interest. 
5. She does not pursue what she thinks she would 
like to do most, be a hospital volunteer or a nurse. 
The last three of these focus largely on Carrie's failure 
to pursue her own self-interest. That she seeks 
motherhood rather than a "career," puts others' interests 
before her own preferences, and continues her current 
job rather than volunteering in a hospital, go to the content 
of what she has chosen rather than to the structure of her 
choosing. The first two deficiencies-her failure to 
choose a life plan and the fact that her upbringing largely 
explains her life--come closer to the core notion of 
autonomy as freedom of choice. But even here, what 
Comstock says links autonomy to a rejection of 
background and tradition that is far too strong. 
To see this, consider some other possible deficiencies 
in Carrie as a chooser, that Comstock does not mention: 
6. Carrie lacks important knowledge about the 
courses of life available to her. She apparently 
has little experience of what nursing is actually 
like and whether she would enjoy it. She 
believes, falsely, that her family would oppose 
a change, so she perceives herself as hemmed 
in, when she is not. 
c~ 7. She is paid the wages of a secretary rather than 
an administrative assistant, and she accepts this 
~. exploitation uncomplainingly, without apparently 
even recognizing it. 
8. She is vaguely dissatisfied with her life, casting 
out for something different but not knowing 
how to go about finding it. 
These do suggest defects in Carrie as a chooser: lack 
of knowledge, a failure to value her own contributions, 
and the vague sense that whatever it is that she wants, 
she is not getting it. To be sure, the search for fuller 
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knowledge and a more secure sense of her own value 
might well be at odds with the person Carrie now is. 
She does not think in these ways, and if she did, she 
might reexamine her background and change some of 
what she values. On the other hand, a fuller sense of 
her own value and possibilities might resolve some of 
Carrie's current dissatisfaction and place her current 
virtues, her nurturance and caring, on a more secure 
footing in her life. There are risks to autonomy, but 
Comstock is wrong to see these risks as principally the 
risks of selfishness. 
Finally, suppose we grant that a more autonomous 
Carrie would have lost something of value. It does not 
follow that autonomy is irrelevant to how others should 
treat her. Even if she does not recognize her own worth 
and demand more, she is wronged by someone who 
pays her too little. Carrie is in a classic double bind 
situation diagnosed by feminists: hurt if she risks 
changes, yet diminished even in her own eyes if she 
does not. Respecting her autonomy in this context raises 
complex and important issues. Participants in the debate 
over how to treat both humans and nonhurnans, in may 
different contexts, would do better to focus on the 
characteristics of creatures and their situations that 
matter morally, and why and how these characteristics 
matter, rather than bright lines or irrelevance. 
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